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AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: THE TEST FLUNKS
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the
law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate over-
whelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic
pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful,
and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.'
In its 1968 decision in Board of Education v. Allen,2 the Supreme
Court recognized that parochial schools in our society perform two funda-
mental functions. They serve the interests of the state in the seculars
education of its children and they promote the religious mission of the
sponsoring church. In upholding a New York program which extended to
parochial school children the benefits of free loans of state-owned textbooks,
the Court in Allen recognized the ability of the state to aid parochial schools
in a manner which did not violate the constitutional prohibition against "laws
respecting an establishment of religion."' 4  State aid programs challenged in
the future, the Court said, would be measured by a two-pronged constitution-
al test. The program must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Each case which has succeeded Allen has presented innovative pro-
grams which sought to satisfy the secular purpose and primary effect test. In
each case, the Court has found some constitutional infirmity, either by
adding new criteria to the test, or by drawing exceedingly fine factual or
legal distinctions. To date, not a single program of state aid to parochial
schools has survived scrutiny under the Court's establishment clause test. 5
These results suggest that the present test used by the Court is not a use-
ful tool for distinguishing those forms of state aid to parochial schools
1. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), cited in Meek v. Pittinger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 662 (1974) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
2. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
3. "Secular" is defined as "not spiritual; not ecclesiastical; relating to the affairs of
the present world." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1521 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Throughout
the opinions of the Court discussed herein, "secular" has been defined as "neutral, non-
sectarian, and non-ideological."
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The religion clauses of the first amendment were found
to be embodied within the concept of "liberty" and thus made applicable to the states
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
5. The term "establishment clause test", as used herein, refers to the test currently
being used by the Supreme Court to determine whether or not a program of state aid to
parochial schools violates the constitutional prohibition against laws "respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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which are constitutional from those which are not. This article will assess
that utility.
The analysis will begin with a discussion of the development of the
establishment clause test in the narrow context of state aid to parochial
schools and the manner in which the Court has applied it to the various
programs it has considered. This part of the analysis will illustrate that the
range of aid which is acceptable to the Court is considerably narrower in
scope than that expressed by the test. The second part of the analysis will
view the development of the test from a theoretical perspective, and will
reveal a process of retreat from the broad position expressed in Allen that
the state may aid secular educational functions to the current narrow view
that the "potential for political divisiveness" posed by a state aid program
may constitute a supportive ground for a finding of unconstitutionality.
Finally, the article will point out two possible conclusions which may be
drawn from this analysis: either the Court has failed in its attempt to
develop a meaningful constitutional test for measuring state programs of aid
to parochial schools against the establishment clause or the Court's decision
in Allen was an aberration from the Court's true position on the issue-the
stern no-aid view expressed in Everson v. Board of Education.
6
Tim TEST DEVELOPS
Everson: The Wall of Separation
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of state aid to
parochial schools under the first amendment establishment clause in Everson
v. Board of Education7 in 1947. The challenged programs provided free
transportation of students to all schools, public and parochial. The plaintiffs
argued that by making it easier for students to get to parochial schools, the
state was also making those schools more attractive to prospective students
and their parents. In addition, by removing the burden of transportation
costs, the state was making it possible for parents to donate additional funds
to the parochial schools in support of religious activities.
Justice Black, in a lengthy opinion for the majority, reviewed the
historical foundations of the establishment clause9 and concluded:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the first amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
6. 330 U.S. 1(1947).
7. Id.
8. Law of June 9, 1941, oh. 191, §§ 1-2, [1941] N.J. Laws 581 (Now 18A N.J.
REv. STAT. ch. 39, § 1 (Supp. 1974)).
9. The majority opinion of Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947) and the dissenting opinions of Justice Jackson and Justice Rutledge
contain an extensive review of the historical origins of the religion clauses of the first
amendment. In addition, Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments is reprinted as an appendix to the opinion. 330 U.S. at 63.
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can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attend-
ance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice reli-
gion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice-versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against the establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
a "wall of separation between Church and State."' 1
Despite the existence of this proverbial "wall of separation," Justice Black
found that the free transportation of children to schools, public and parochial
alike, did not offend the establishment clause. He viewed the program as an
exercise of the state's power to protect the health and safety of school
children. To be sure, he wrote, there was some benefit to the religious
schools, but such benefit was only the incidental and indirect effect of a
proper exercise of the state's police power. The primary benefit was to
parents and children, not to church-sponsored schools. Justice Black quali-
fied his decision by saying that although the program was constitutional, it
was on the "verge"" of unconstitutionality.
12
Allen: Secular Educational Functions May Be Aided
In 1968, the Court decided Board of Education v. Allen.' 3 In Allen,
establishment clause objections were raised to a New York statute14 which
provided for the free loan of secular textbooks to all school children in the
state regardless of their choice of public or parochial schools. Books loaned
under this program were to be those which were "designated for use in any
public elementary or secondary schools of the state or. .. approved by any
boards of education," and which were required course material.15
The Court upheld the program under the Everson rationale,' 6 finding
that the primary economic benefit was to parents and children, not to the
parochial schools. It also found that since ownership of the textbooks
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id. at 17.
12. Black's decision was severely criticized in dissents by Justices Jackson and
Rutledge. Both would have built the wall of separation high enough to exclude even free
bus transportation of parochial school students. Id. at 18, 28.
13. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
14. Law of Mar. 29, 1950, ch. 239, §§ 1-4, [1950] N.Y. Laws 754.
15. Law of Mar. 29, 1950, ch. 239, § 1, [1950] N.Y. Laws 754.
16. It is interesting to note that Justice Black was among those dissenting in Allen.
392 U.S. at 250.
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remained technically with the state, the textbooks were loaned not to
parochial schools, but to parochial school students.17
More importantly, Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in
Allen, indicated that establishment clause doctrine had advanced beyond the
narrow "student benefit" concept of Everson. He preferred to express the
rule in the broader language of the Court's decision on school prayer, School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp.' s In Schempp, the Court stated
that a statute comports with the establishment clause if it has a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 19 This, Justice White wrote, was the essence of the establishment
clause test of Everson and the standard by which future programs would be
measured.
20
Allen was a landmark decision for a number of reasons. First, while it
purported to be an extension of the "student benefit" rule of Everson, it also
proposed that state aid programs be measured by the "purpose and effect"
test. Second, Allen recognized that secular educational functions performed
by parochial schools were separate and distinct from religious functions, and
that the state could, in a proper exercise of its powers, aid the secular
functions without violating the establishment clause. Finally, Allen carried
the clear implication that the Court would uphold other forms of aid to
parochial schools if they complied with the "purpose and effect" test.
The Third Test: Entanglements
Subsequent to Allen, the Court held, in Walz v. Tax Commission,21
that in addition to examining the purpose and effect of a program under the
establishment clause, it would also examine the relationship the program
would create between church and state. If the program unduly entangled 22
the church or the state in the affairs of the other it was unconstitutional. Thus,
a third factor was added to the establishment clause test, that of "excessive
entanglements."
Walz was an establishment clause case, but the issue was not presented
in the context of aid to parochial schools. The factual context presented in
Walz was unique in two ways. First, the practice challenged-the granting
17. Justice Douglas, in dissent, challenged the idea that the books were being
loaned to students, and not to parochial schools. Id. at 254. Justice Brennan raised a
similar argument based on a similar analysis to the Court's textbook loan decision in
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 379 (1975).
18. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
19. Justice Black wrote a vigorous dissent in Allen. 392 U.S. at 250. He reasoned
that the Allen decision and the rationale used to sustain it were the first steps down the
road to the establishment of state religion.
20. Id. at 242.
21. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
22. The Court has never defined "entanglements". Instead, it has proceeded on a
case by case basis.
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of state tax exemptions to religious institutions2 3S-pre-dated the Constitu-
tion itself. 24  Second, the substantial economic benefit conferred on those
institutions by this practice was the result of state abstention from the
exercise of its taxing powers, not the overt appropriation of state tax funds.
In upholding this time-honored practice, the Court noted that one of the
cornerstones of the establishment clause was the principle that the state, in
its dealings with the churches, must maintain a "wholesome neutrality."
Thus, the Court determined that it must examine the church-state relation-
ship established by the tax exemptions and assess the entanglements created.
It found that both taxation and tax exemption involved the state in the
affairs of religion.
The entanglements arising out of taxation would include tax valuation
of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures and criminal liability.25 The
only entanglement arising from tax exemption was that the state would have
to inquire as to whether or not a particular institution was a "religious" one.
The Court chose that course which caused the lesser number of entangling
relationships-the continued allowance of tax exemptions.
Subsequently, in the context of positive aid to parochial schools, the
Court adopted the excessive entanglements test in Lemon v. Kurtzman26 and
its companion case, Early v. DiCenso.27 The Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
aid programs challenged in these two cases complied with the Allen purpose
and effect test. Both had a secular legislative purpose28 and both attempted
to avoid advancing the religious mission of the schools by carefully limiting
the aid to secular purposes.
The Rhode Island program29 challenged in DiCenso provided for a 15
percent salary supplement for teachers who taught only secular subjects in
the parochial schools. The teachers were required to agree in writing not to
teach courses in religion while receiving salary supplements from the state.
The payments were apparently made directly to the teachers and were
limited: a teacher receiving salary supplements could not earn more than a
comparable teacher in a public school. To qualify for these salary supple-
ments, the State Commissioner of Education required the parochial schools
23. N.Y. RE-AL PRoPERTY TAX LAW § 421(a)(1) (McKinney 1972).
24. See concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. at 683.
25. 397 U.S. at 674.
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. Id.
28. In none of the cases in which programs of state aid to parochial schools were
challenged was the legislative purpose of the enactment successfully attacked. It is
apparent that the improvement of secular education is a sufficient secular purpose under
the test.
29. Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-51-1 et seq.
(Supp. 1970).
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to submit financial data evidencing a per-pupil average expenditure below
the average spent in the public schools.
The Pennsylvania programs" challenged in Kurtzman provided for the
"purchase" of specified secular educational services from the parochial
schools. Payments under the purchase "contracts" 3' would be made directly to
the parochial schools, solely for their expenditures for teachers' salaries, text-
books, and instructional materials. The schools were required to maintain
prescribed accounting procedures which clearly segregated secular from non-
secular expenditures. These accounts were subject to state audit. The
payments were limited to reimbursement for courses taught in the public
schools, such as mathematics, modem foreign languages, physical science,
and physical education. Textbooks and instructional materials included in
the program had to be those approved by the state. The statute prohibited
payments for any course containing "any subject matter expressing religious
teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect."'3 2
The Court held that both programs created unconstitutional entangle-
ments between church and state. In so holding, the Court reasoned that
while the content of a textbook could be assessed and determined to be of a
secular nature, the handling of secular subjects by a teacher could not. Thus,
under the Rhode Island program, to ensure that teachers were not using their
state-subsidized classroom time to promote the religious mission of the
school, the state would have to conduct a continuous system of surveillance.
The Pennsylvania "purchase of service" concept was found entangling
because of the requirements that the parochial schools provide financial
data, keep accounts as prescribed by the state, and open their accounts to
state audit procedures.
The application of the entanglements criterion to the programs chal-
lenged in Kurtzman and DiCenso provides a vivid illustration of the fact that
the tripartite establishment clause test developed through the pronouncement
of overly-broad general rules from narrow factual contexts. As noted
previously, the entanglements test was born in the unique factual context
presented in Walz, where the Court had to decide upon the continued
existence of tax exemptions for religious institutions. In essence, the choice
was between allowing the exemptions to continue, thus advancing religion by
conferring upon it a substantial economic benefit, and discontinuing the ex-
emptions, which would have the effect of inhibiting religion because the
result would be to require the states to tax religious institutions, thus
30. Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Law of
June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 232, No. 109, §§ 1-8, [1968] Pa. Stat. 232.
31. The word "contracts" is placed in quotation marks here, as it was in the Court's
opinion, because it was the belief of the Court that the term was used by the legislature
euphemistically, to disguise the true nature of the program, which was in effect a direct
grant.
32. 403 U.S. at 610.
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placing a substantial economic burden upon them. Faced with this dilem-
ma, the Court found the entanglements criterion useful in choosing between
the lesser of two evils.
The choices faced in Kurtzman and DiCenso, however, did not pose the
same dilemma. There was no time-honored practice being challenged.
There was no possibility of an economic benefit to religion since both states
had limited their aid to solely secular purposes, consonant with the Allen
holding. Nor would a holding which struck down the programs result in
state action which would have the effect of inhibiting religion. In short,
there was no compelling need to apply the entanglements criterion to
Kurtzman and DiCenso.
Application of the entanglements test to the facts of Kurtzman and
DiCenso also proved to be awkward. The Court construed the financial
controls placed on these programs by the respective legislatures 33 not as an
exercise of fiscal responsibility or governmental accountability, but as a
recognition by the two legislatures that the teachers who would teach secular
subjects in the environment of a religious school might find it difficult to
remain religiously neutral. The controls necessary to ensure against this
potential evil, the Court found,3 4 would create an excessively entangling
relationship between church and state.
The Court also concluded that both programs possessed a "potential for
political divisiveness" since they required an annual legislative appropriation
of tax funds. Chief Justice Burger explained:
In a community where such a large number of pupils are served
by church-related schools, it can be assumed that state assistance
will entail considerable political activity. Partisans of parochial
schools, understandably concerned with rising costs and sincerely
dedicated to both the religious and secular educational missions of
their schools, will inevitably champion this cause and promote po-
litical action to achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid,
whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevita-
bly respond and employ all of the usual political campaign tech-
niques to prevail. Candidates will be forced to declare and voters
to choose. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many
people confronted with issues of this kind will find their votes
aligned with their faith.
35
The Chief Justice pointed out that while such activities were normally healthy
manifestations of democratic processes, when the religion clauses were at is-
sue, the normal processes must take a back seat to the danger of potential
political disorder.
33. Generally, these controls consisted of required accounting procedures, sub-
mission of financial data, and state audit of parochial school accounts.
34. The Court suggested, as a possible control, a continuous system of surveillance
of the teachers in the parochial schools. 403 U.S. at 619.
35. Id. at 622.
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The Kurtzman decision did not make clear, however, just what place
the potential political divisiveness factor would take within the Court's test.
There is expressed in the opinion a definite view that it is a form of entan-
gling relationship. But the question of whether or not political divisiveness is
sufficient in and of itself to render a program unconstitutional is not
answered. The question is important because if answered in the affirmative
any program of state aid to parochial schools funded by annual legislative
appropriations would be unconstitutional. The Court's decision in Commit-
tee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,'6 the case which
followed Kurtzman, dealt with this aspect of the problem.
Nyquist: Indirect Aid Approach
Stating that "the right to select among alternative educational systems
should be available in a pluralistic society, and that any sharp decline in
non-public school pupils would massively increase public school enrollments
and costs, seriously jeopardizing quality education for all children, 37 the New
York legislature adopted three programs of aid to parochial schools.38 These
programs were the subject of establishment clause challenges in Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.3 9
The first program 40 provided for direct money grants to non-public
schools for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment to ensure the
students' health, welfare and safety. 4' The Court found this program
unconstitutional as having the primary effect of advancing religion, since the
religious schools would be required to maintain their facilities in a safe
condition whether or not the funds came from the state, and because the
effect of the state grant would be to allow them discretion to use funds which
normally would have been spent for maintenance and repair for religious
purposes.
42
The other programs presented novel approaches to the financial plight
of parochial schools. One provided for reimbursement by the state of
parochial school tuition paid by low-income families.43 The amount of the
reimbursement was limited to $50 per grade school child, and $100 per high
school student, and could not exceed 50 percent of the actual tuition paid.
The other program provided for tax relief for those families ineligible for the
36. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
37. Id. at 763.
38. Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 414, §§ 1-5, [1972] N.Y. Laws 881.
39. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
40. Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 414, § 1, [1972] N.Y. Laws 881.
41. There was some debate among the parties to this case over the particular label
given this arrangement. The Court felt that the precise label was unimportant. Rather,
it looked to the overall effect of the program. 413 U.S. at 789.
42. Id. at 780, 794.
43. Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 414, § 5 [1972] N.Y. Laws 881.
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tuition reimbursements. A statutory formula provided for "tax credits"'44
which would be nearly identical in amount to the sum refunded under the
reimbursement plan.
The Court found that these programs also had the unconstitutional
primary effect of advancing religion 45 in spite of the fact that the aid was
given to the families of parochial students and not directly to the parochial
schools. Stating that the identity of the aid recipient was only one factor to
be considered 46 in a determination of the total effect of a particular
program, the Court found the total effect of these programs indistinguishable
from a direct grant scheme, with one additional infirmity. The direct grants
proposed in the "purchase of service" concept challenged in Kurtzman and
in the maintenance and repair segments of the act challenged in Nyquist
were limited solely to secular uses, whereas the indirect aid under these
programs was not so limited. These monies could be used for any purpose
without any restrictions on the recipients. Thus, they might be used to
advance the religious mission of the schools.
Even though these programs were found unconstitutional under the
advancement of religion test, the Court felt compelled to make the observa-
tion that "apart from any specific entanglement of the state in particular
religious programs, assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential
for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to
religion."'47 Noting that this concept applied with peculiar force to the New
York statute in question, 48 the Court found the challenged programs
politically divisive in two ways. With respect to the direct grants authorized
by the maintenance and repair sections of the act, a possibility of divisive-
ness existed because of the need for an annual legislative appropriation. In
regard to the indirect aid authorized through the tax credit and tuition
reimbursement plans, which required no appropriations, the possibility existed
as a result of the constant pressures which would be created by increasing
costs and by proponents of such programs to expand the benefits under these
programs. Justice Powell expressed this view as follows:
[W]e know from long experience with both Federal and State gov-
ernments that aid programs of any kind tend to become en-
trenched, to escalate in cost, and to generate their own aggressive
constituencies. And the larger the class of recipients, the greater
the pressure for accelerated increases. Moreover, the State itself,
concededly anxious to avoid assuming the burden of educating chil-
dren now in private and parochial schools, has a strong motivation
for increasing this aid as public school costs rise and population in-
creases. In this situation, where the underlying issue is the deeply
44. Id.
45. 413 U.S. at 780, 794.
46. Id. at 781.
47. Id. at 794.
48. Id. at 796.
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emotional one of Church-State relationships, the potential for seri-
ously divisive political consequences needs no elaboration.
49
Justice Powell further noted that this potential for political divisiveness is not
to be accorded equal weight with entangling church-state relationships as a
separate and distinct ground of unconstitutionality. Potential political divi-
siveness is, according to Justice Powell, merely a "warning signal" not to be
ignored.
50
Meek v. Pittinger: Selective Application of the Tripartite Test
The Supreme Court recently completed a review of four Pennsylvania
aid to parochial school programs in Meek v. Pittinger.51 The four programs
provided for the loan of textbooks,52 instructional materials, 53 instructional
equipment, 54 and for auxiliary services55 to children attending qualified non-
public schools, that is, schools which met -the state's compulsory attendance
requirement.
These programs were accompanied by legislative findings that the
welfare of the school children and the state required that all school children
be provided with free textbooks, instructional materials and equipment, and
auxiliary services. It was noted that approximately 25 percent of the state's
children attended non-public schools. The express intent of the legislature
was to extend the benefits of equal educational materials and services to
non-public school children. 56
Instructional materials were defined to include books, periodicals,
documents, pamphlets, photographs, reproductions, pictorial or graphic
works, musical scores, maps and globes. 57 Instructional equipment was
defined to include projection equipment, recording equipment, and laborato-
ry equipment. 58  Auxiliary services included guidance, counseling and
testing services, psychological services, services for exceptional children,
remedial and therapeutic services, speech and hearing services, and services
for the improvement of the educationally disadvantaged. 59
49. Id. at 797.
50. Id. at 798.
51. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
52. Law of July 12, 1972, Pub. L. 861, No. 194, § 1, [19721 Pa. Stat. 861.
53. Law of July 12, 1972, Pub. L. 863, No. 195, § 1, [1972] Pa. Stat. 863.
54. Id.
55. Law of July 12, 1972, Pub. L. 861, No. 194, § 1, [1972] Pa. Stat. 861.
56. 421 U.S. at 352, n.2. Throughout this text, the author has used the term
"parochial", whereas the legislative enactments under discussion usually used the term
"non-public", which includes the term "parochial". The author chose the term "paro-
chial" because the vast bulk of "non-public" school children attend "parochial" schools,
and because establishment clause issues are not presented in the case of aid to "non-
public, non-parochial" private schools. "Parochial", as used herein, is defined as a
private or non-public school run or supported by a religious organization or church.
57. Law of July 12, 1972, Pub. L. 861, No. 194, § 1, [1972] Pa. Stat. 861.
58. Law of July 12, 1972, Pub. L. 863, No. 195, § 1, [19721 Pa. Stat. 863.
59. Law of July 12, 1972, Pub. L. 861, No. 194, § 1, [1972] Pa. Stat. 861.
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These programs, like similar programs which preceded them, were seem-
ingly designed to meet the objections raised by the Court in Kurtzman and
Nyquist. All aid was limited to the non-sectarian, neutral and non-ideological
functions performed by the parochial schools. The textbook loan program was
virtually identical to that upheld in Allen. In one sense, the textbook program
was even stricter than New York's program since the textbooks which could be
loaned under this program had to be those which were approved for use by
the local school board. In Allen, it was possible for the parochial school of-
ficials to request and receive a textbook of their own choosing. This could not
occur in the Pennsylvania scheme challenged in Meek.60
The instructional equipment and materials programs were designed to
meet the Court's objections to direct grants of aid in Kurtzman and Nyquist,
by providing for a loan, rather than an outright grant, of these forms of aid.
The relationship of the school to the state was akin to that of a bailee of
such materials and equipment. The parochial school would merely have pos-
session of neutral, non-sectarian, non-ideological state property for the use
and benefit of the school children. The school would receive no direct eco-
nomic benefit from the programs.
Similarly, the auxiliary services program was designed to meet previous
court objections. The services under this program were to be provided by
employees of the public school system. As the district court characterized it,
the program was one which provided for travelling therapists, rather than
travelling students. 61
The district court upheld -the textbook loan program, -the auxiliary serv-
ices program, and the instructional materials program. Its approval of the
instructional equipment loan program was limited. Only equipment of a
"self-policing" nature, that is, equipment such as science laboratory fixtures
and supplies which were not readily adaptable to religious uses, could be
loaned. 62  Equipment not of a self-policing nature, such as audio-visual
devices, were found to be an unconstitutional advancement of religion,
since they could easily be used for religious' purposes. Such use would
confer an economic benefit on the parochial school by making available
free-of-charge equipment which would otherwise have to be rented or pur-
chased.
3
In upholding the textbook and instructional material loans, the district
court cited Allen as authority and refused to draw any constitutional
distinction between secular, neutral, non-ideological textbooks, on the one
hand, and secular, neutral, non-ideological "books, periodicals, documents,
60. 421 U.S. at 361, n.ll.
61. 374 F. Supp. 639, 657 (1974).
62. ld. at 661.
63. Id.
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pamphlets, photographs, reproductions,"'64 on the other. These materials,
the court found, were of a self-policing nature and could not be readily
converted to religious purposes. As with the textbook program, ownership
of these materials remained technically in the state.6 5
The district court also upheld the auxiliary services program, finding
that it was based on a secular legislative purpose, that it did not have a pri-
mary effect of advancing religion, and that it possessed no excessive en-
tangling church-state relationships.6" The primary effect requirement was
satisfied by the neutral, non-sectarian, non-ideological nature of these serv-
ices, as well as by the fact that no direct monetary benefit accrued to the
parochial school. The entanglement issue, the district court felt, was covered
by the secular nature of the services, but more importantly by the fact that
the services were to be provided by employees of the public school system,
subject to the supervision and control of the state.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the loan of textbooks.6 7 Justice
Stewart, speaking for the Court, reviewed the program in some detail and
found it to be identical in every material respect to the one considered in
Allen.68 The other programs, however, were found to contain some con-
stitutional infirmity.
The loan of instructional materials and equipment, the Court found,
had the primary effect of advancing religion, 69 regardless of the fact that by
keeping ownership of the equipment and materials in the state the religious
schools received no direct economic benefit. The majority expressed the
view that "[e]ven though earmarked for secular purposes, '[w]hen [aid]
flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial
portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission,' state aid has
the primary effect of advancing religion." °70 In so stating, the Court appeared
to be rejecting the position it had adopted in Allen-that the secular and
64. Id. at 659.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 657.
67. 421 U.S. 349, 359.
68. Justice Stewart was joined in this portion of the opinion by Justice Blackmun
and Justice Powell. A majority on this program was concluded by Justice Rehnquist
who, joined by Justice White, 421 U.S. at 387, found simply that the program was
"constitutionally indistinguishable" from that upheld in Allen, but did not elaborate to
the same degree as Justice Stewart. Just what difference of opinion exists on this issue
between Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist is not clear from their respective opinions.
Apparently, it indicates a less than whole-hearted acceptance by Rehnquist and White of
the Allen rationale. Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented from the
textbook holding. The Chief Justice also wrote a separate opinion concurring with the
textbook holding and dissenting from the auxiliary services portion of the decision.
69. Having found loans of instructional equipment and materials unconstitutional
under the primary effect test, the Court did not find it necessary to discuss any possible
entanglements.
70. 421 U.S. at 366.
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non-secular functions of the parochial schools are separate and distinct and
the state could aid the secular activities without aiding the religious func-
tions.
71
The Court also rejected the auxiliary services program,72 on the basis
that the district court had erred in relying on the good faith and professional-
ism of the secular teachers and counsellors functioning in church-related
schools to insure that a strictly non-ideological posture would be maintained. 73
To insure a non-ideological posture, the Court held, the state would have to
engage in a continuous system of surveillance of teachers, and such "pro-
phylactic contacts . . . necessarily give rise to a constitutionally intolerable
degree of entanglement between church and state.
'74
The entanglement argument used by the Court appears to be of
doubtful validity. Since the teachers who would be performing the auxiliary
services were employees of the public school system, they would not have
been subject to the control or discipline of any religious authority. There
appears to be no reason why the state could not, under this program, conduct
a system of surveillance of its own employees without any interference with
religion. The Court's response to this argument was:
[The teachers] are performing important educational services in
schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant sec-
tarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the ad-
vancement of religious belief is constantly maintained. . . . The
potential for impermissible fostering of religion under these circum-
stances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present. To be
certain that auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral, as the
Constitution demands, the State would have to impose limitations
on the activities of auxiliary personnel and then engage in some
form of continuing surveillance to ensure that those restrictions
were being followed.7 5
This sort of entanglement is based on an assumption that the public
school employees who would have performed the auxiliary services would
have shared the same religious faith as that promoted by the parochial school
to which they were assigned. There was no requirement in the challenged
legislation that auxiliary services personnel meet any religious requirements
of the parochial school. It was conceivable that under this program a Jewish
or agnostic teacher might be assigned to a Roman Catholic school. Such
personnel would hardly be likely to intentionally or inadvertently promote
the Catholic religion. Indeed, there is as great a danger that religious
neutrality might be violated within the public schools. No doubt, if a public
school teacher were to promote the tenets of one particular religious faith in
71. 392 U.S. at 245.
72. Id. at 372.
73. Id. at 369.
74. Id. at 370.
75. Id. at 371.
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a public school classroom, effective measures could be taken to insure
religious neutrality. There appears to be no reason why the same response
would not have been possible or appropriate under Pennsylvania's auxiliary
services program.
In addition to disallowing the auxiliary services program on the basis of
excessive entanglements, the Court found that the program involved a
potential for political divisiveness by virtue of the fact that it would require
an annual appropriation by the legislature.7 6 This potential for political
divisiveness plus the entangling aspects found to exist in the auxiliary
services program combined, in the opinion of the Court, to render the
program an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
77
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THEORY AS APPLIED
Up to this point, the development of the three part establishment clause
test and the manner in which it has been applied by the Court have been
discussed. The discussion has illustrated the limited utility of the current test
in distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional forms of aid to paro-
chial schools. A discussion of the theoretical bases for the establishment
clause which have found expression in the opinions of the Court will now be
presented in the belief that when these theoretical positions are compared
with the Court's decisions, the true position of the Court towards aid to
parochial education will be illuminated.
Few issues have spawned as much legal literature as the meaning and
interpretation of the religion clauses of the first amendment. There are at
least six theoretical positions posed by eminent legal scholars which attempt
to interpret the establishment clause in the context of aid to parochial
schools. 78 These positions range in scope from the view that the establish-
76. Id. at 372.
77. Shortly after the Court's decision in Meek, the Illinois General Assembly
amended the Illinois School Code to allow parochial school children the benefits of loans
of state-owned textbooks. The amendment to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 18-17 (1975)
reads as follows:
The Illinois Office of Education shall provide the following free of charge
to any student in this State who is enrolled in grades kindergarten through
12 at a public school or at a school other than a public school which is in
compliance with the compulsory attendance laws of this State and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the loan of secular textbooks listed for use by the
Office of Education. The foregoing service shall be provided directly to the
students at their request or at the request of their parents or guardians. The
Office of Education shall adopt appropriate regulations to administer this sec-
tion and to facilitate the equitable participation of all students eligible for
benefits hereunder.
78. See generally Note, Aid to Parochial Schools: A Re-examination, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 128 (1972). This article categorized the various theories posed by
various legal scholars on whether or not aid to parochial schools is permissible under the
establishment clause. In the first category are the "absolute" theories, which range from
the absolute position that the establishment clause requires aid, to the absolute position
that the establishment clause prohibits aid. The second category, the "middle ground"
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ment clause absolutely forbids any form of such aid, to the view that such
aid is required by the Constitution. Since it would be unduly repetitive and
unnecessary to review here the various constitutional theories, the discussion
will be limited to those theories which have found expression in the Court's
decisions.
The Wall of Separation
In Everson v. Board of Education,79 Justice Black looked to the source
of the first amendment for a guide to the meaning of the establishment
clause. His conclusion that the clause against the establishment of religion
requires a "wall of separation" between church and state80 was based on his
own examination of the historical background of the religion clauses, which
showed that the real debate over freedom of religion took place in 1785,
during the Virginia Assembly's consideration of a bill which would have
re-established a tax-supported church. Jefferson and Madison led the fight
against passage of the measure. Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance""'
is credited with turning the tide against such tax assessments. There, Madi-
son made the following argument:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish, with
the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all
other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any
one establishment, may force him to conform to any other estab-
lishment in all cases whatsoever?
8 2
Justice Black believed that Madison and Jefferson were opposed not merely
to the establishment of tax-supported churches, but to any taxes levied in
support of one religion, or all religions. Thus religion and government were
to be separated, forever and unequivocally.
Justice Black upheld, however, the New Jersey plan of free bus
transportation for school children in Everson. His rationale was that such a
theories, include the Everson "student benefit" doctrine and two positions of "neutrali-
ty", which again range from the view that neutrality prohibits aid to the view that
neutrality requires aid. The third category is the "no-imposition" theory of Professor
Schwartz, that as long as government aid does not impose religion or religious beliefs
upon its citizens, aid is constitutional. The fourth category contains the "balancing"
theories, which require a case by case approach and a balancing of the benefit of aid to
religion against the public interest. The fifth category represents the "quid pro quo"
approach of Professor Choper, that as long as such aid does not exceed the value of the
secular educational services performed, direct cash grants, for any purpose, may be given
to parochial schools. The sixth category represents the "excessive entanglements"
approach of Walz and Kurtzman, that if such aid will create excessive entangling
relationships between church and state, it is unconstitutional.
79. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
80. Id. at 15.
81. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, par. 3.
(Reprinted as an appendix to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 63).
82. Id.
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program was within the police power of the state and that it must not be
struck down even if it bordered on an establishment of religion. The Court
must be aware, he wrote, that in striking down a program of this type under
the establishment clause, it might encroach upon those rights protected by
the free exercise clause.83 Thus, Justice Black believed that while the
establishment clause required a "wall of separation", the free exercise clause
required that a valid exercise of the state's police powers not be struck
down-even if it bordered on establishment-solely on the basis of a
religious classification.
The net effect of the Everson decision, derived from the conflict
between Justice Black's reasoning that the establishment clause reQuires a
wall of separation and his holding which sanctioned a limited form of
indirect state aid, was that the establishment clause erected something less
than a "wall" of separation. A more accurate analogy would be that the
clause created a "neutral zone" between those activities of the state which
promote religion and those which inhibit religion. Between those two
extremes, both church and state have mutual interests in very limited forms
of interaction. The problem then was to determine the nature of permissible
interaction within that neutral zone. The Court proceeded to do so with
great difficulty.
In Zorach v. Clauson,8 4 the Court found that programs whereby public
school students were released early from school, in order to allow them to
travel to parochial schools for religious instruction, was within the neutral
zone of permissible interaction." Similarly, in the "Sunday-closing law
cases"8 6 the Court found that the state's interest in a day of rest and
recreation for its citizens was within that zone, even though the day
universally chosen for such a day of rest was Sunday, the sabbath of the
Christian religions.
Conversely, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp87 the
Court ruled that compulsory bible reading and prayer in the public schools
were not within the neutral zone. Such activities, it found, were prohibited
religious exercises, even though they favored no religious denomination to
the exclusion of any others. Further, the Schempp court proposed a test to
define the bounds of the neutral zone. Permissible state action must be
within the state's legislative power, and it must neither establish nor inhibit
religion.
83. Id. at 16.
84. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
85. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in Zorach. In the opinion, he
stated that Americans are a deeply religious people and that such a program of "released
time" was within the best traditions of our people. Id. at 313.
86. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Massachusetts, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
87. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Purpose and Effect in the State Aid Context
The Schempp test and the rationale supporting it provided the frame-
work for the Court's decision in Allen. Justice White also observed, based
upon the Court's decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8  that parochial
schools perform both religious and secular functions, and that it was possible,
consonant with the establishment clause, for the state to aid the secular
functions without aiding the religious functions.
Allen, then, appeared to represent a departure from the Everson
position. It apparently was an indication that the establishment clause
would permit a somewhat broader range of aid to parochial schools, as long
as such assistance aided only secular functions in which the state had an
interest. The Court implied that subsequent programs would be measured
by the Schempp purpose and effect test. Allen is the only case, however,
which makes such sweeping generalizations about the constitutionality of aid
to parochial schools.
Kurtzman: The Narrowing Process Begins
The cases which have followed Allen have all narrowed, to a large
degree, the range of secular aid which may be extended to parochial
education. The decision in Walz v. Tax Commission,s9 which was a
challenge to the constitutionality of time-honored property tax exemption
laws for religious institutions, added the excessive entanglements test. In
Walz, the Court was faced with the peculiar factual situation that a
substantial economic benefit accrued to religious institutions, not because of
monies appropriated by the legislature, but because of the almost universal
practice of granting such institutions exemptions from the local and state tax
laws. Thus, the Court faced a dilemma. To uphold the practice would
sanction a direct and substantial economic benefit. To strike down the
practice would require the states to tax religious institutions, and to employ
all of the procedures authorized by the tax laws to ensure their collection.9"
The Court recognized long ago in McCulloch v. Maryland,91 that the power
88. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). One chronic issue is whether or not church-sponsored
schools and the secular courses taught in them are "permeated" with the religious
doctrines of the sponsoring church. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the argument was
used affirmatively by proponents of religious schools to prevent their being legislated out
of existence. Today, those who favor state aid to parochial schools use the negative
approach-that secular courses taught in parochial schools are not permeated with
religious doctrines. See also Drinan, Implications of the Allen Textbook Decision, 14
CATH. LAwYER 285 (1968); Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1680 (1969); Valente, Aid to Church-related Education-New Directions
Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. REv. 579 (1969).
89. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
90. These include: tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures,
and criminal liability. See note 21 supra.
91. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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to tax is the power to destroy. Faced with these alternatives, the Court
chose to determine which alternative allowed the state to best maintain its
neutrality. It chose that relationship it found least entangling, and upheld
the tax exemption laws.
Thus, the excessive entanglements test was born, not from the dictates
or commands of the establishment clause, but from a unique factual
situation, in which either course of action posed grave constitutional con-
sequences. No such dilemma faced the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, where
the alternatives were to either allow or disallow affirmative state aid to
church-supported schools. The failure of the state to aid would not, as in
Walz, confer an economic benefit on church-related schools. Rather, it
would result in increasing economic hardship for those schools. Still, the
Court chose to apply the narrow holding of Walz to limit the wide-ranging
implications of Allen.
In adopting the test of excessive entanglements, and in finding that
potential political divisiveness is a form of such entanglement, the Court
cited 92 the views of Professor Paul A. Freund, expressed in a 1969 article,
Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools.93 Freund expressed the belief
that the establishment clause absolutely prohibits aid to parochial schools,
and that the Allen decision, although narrowly written, was in error. Fearful
that Allen would generate a new wave of state aid cases, Freund wrote that
,the Court would face three alternatives in the cases which would inevitably
follow: To hold that state aid was mandated by the first amendment; to hold
that such aid was permitted by the first amendment; or to reverse itself and
hold that the first amendment prohibited aid. In light of his view that the
establishment clause prohibits aid, Freund discounted the position that the
Court should find state aid mandatory. The real choice, he believed, was
between permission and prohibition. To permit state aid would allow the
issues to be ultimately settled by the operation of the political and judicial
processes in each state or locality, 94 while to prohibit state aid would serve
to "defuse the political issue." 95
Based upon the belief that political division along religious lines was
"one of the principal evils that the First Amendment sought to forestall,""
92. 403 U.S. at 622.
93. 82 H,v. L. Rav. 1680 (1969).
94. Id. at 1691.
95. Id.
96. Id. Freund failed to substantiate his assertion that where the religious clauses
of the first amendment were at issue, the normal democratic processes were not to be
relied upon in arriving at a correct constitutional resolution. See generally Ellington,
Principle of Non-divisiveness and the Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 5 GA. L. REv. 429 (1971), for another discussion of the potential political
divisiveness factor. The discussion begins with Freund's assertion that political divisive-
ness was one of the principal evils against which the first amendment was intended to
protect. Ellington then discusses history and precedent to find support for the assertion.
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Freund advocated that the Court attempt to defuse the political issues by
overruling the state aid programs it would subsequently consider. In order
to do so, the Court would be required to reverse its holding in Board of
Education v. Allen, since Allen had already recognized that at least some aid
was permissible under the establishment clause, that is, aid which assisted
secular educational functions.
THE COURT'S POSITION TODAY
In Meek v. Pittinger, the most recent aid to parochial schools decision,
the Court, in upholding the loan of textbooks, has reaffirmed its decision in
Allen. However, it also, consistent with Kurtzman and Nyquist, and with
the views of Professor Freund, overruled three other programs of state aid to
parochial schools. Thus, the Court has, on one hand, adopted the view that
some aid is constitutional. On the other hand, it has adopted the view that
the establishment clause prohibits such aid. This phenomenon suggests two
possible conclusions as to the current position of the Court.
The first is that the "no-aid" dicta of Justice Black in Everson v. Board
of Education is in fact the current rule on the issue of aid to parochial
schools. 97 Under this view, the Court's decision in Board of Education v.
Allen was widely misinterpreted. Since it is possible to view Allen as no
more than an extension of the student benefit rule of Everson, Allen may be
viewed as merely having moved the "verge" of unconstitutionality from one
point to another. The adoption of the purpose and effect test in Allen was
simply an attempt to provide a means for distinguishing those strictly limited
forms of aid allowed by Everson. The main defect of the test is its overly
broad wording and imprecise definition. The decisions which followed
Allen-Kurtzman, Nyquist, and Meek-were based on a legislative misinter-
pretation of the Allen case. All of the programs considered in these cases
were much too broad in scope to survive the very narrow Allen test.
The second possibility is that Allen did in fact represent a retreat
from the stem "no-aid" position of Everson. Under this view, the conclusion
to be reached is that the development of the tripartite establishment clause
test has, to date, failed. This failure consists of the inability of the Court to
express its test in terms which express meaningful distinctions. This, in turn,
resulted from the promulgation of broad general rules from narrow factual
situations. The general rules were applicable to the narrow factual situation
under consideration, but were inappropriate when applied to subsequent
factual situations. The end result is that no new plans of aid to parochial
He concludes that avoidance of political division was an "aspirational norm" embodied
within the establishment clause.
97. See generally Kauper, Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to
Everson?, 24 CAsE, W. RES. L. REv. 107 (1974).
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schools have passed the test, and many difficult, narrow legal distinctions
have been drawn.
The conclusion offered here is that the former view is more likely to
represent the current position of the Court. The very existence of an
establishment clause test implies that there are programs which will pass the
test. As illustrated in the first part of the analysis, no new programs of state
aid to parochial schools enacted since Allen have passed the Court's test.
This observation, combined with the adoption by the Court of the views of
Professor Freund, leads to the conclusion that the Everson decision has been
re-vitalized, that the Court has changed its position on the ability of the
states to aid secular educational functions in parochial schools, and that the
"wall of separation" between church and state allows only a very limited
amount of aid to parochial schools.
CONCLUSION
It has not been the intention of the author to present the arguments in
favor of or against aid to parochial schools. The sole purpose of this article
has been to assess the utility of the Supreme Court's tripartite establishment
clause test in distinguishing those programs of aid which are constitutional,
from those which are not.
The discussion of the cases from Allen through Meek has revealed that
the Court has stated its test in broad terms, but applied it in an exceedingly
narrow manner. The discussion of the theories which underlie the test, and
the adoption of the views of Professor Freund, has revealed that perhaps the
Court is attempting to steer a middle course between the opposing forces on
the issue of aid to parochial schools. To those who favor such aid, the Court
offers a constitutional test and thus implies that a program may yet be
conceived which will provide the substantial aid needed to avert the financial
ruin of parochial schools. To those who oppose such aid, the Court offers a
narrow application of its test, and its apparent adherence to the views of
Professor Freund which virtually assures that no additional aid programs will
be upheld. Thus it may be said that the tripartite establishment clause test
is not a useful tool in making constitutional distinctions among programs of
state aid to parochial schools, at least not in the hands of a Court which does
not appear to favor such aid.
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